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Social hierarchy is persistent in all almost all societies. Social norms and their enforcement 
are  part  of  sustaining  hierarchical  systems.  This  paper  combines  social  status  and  norm 
enforcement, by introducing status in a dictator game with third party punishment. Status is 
conveyed by surname; half of the third parties face a dictator with a noble name and half face 
a dictator with a common name. Receivers all have common names. We find that low status 
men are punished to a greater extent than low status women, high status men, or high status 
women. Interestingly, discrimination occurs only in male to male interaction. For offers below 
half, or close to half of the allocated resource, male third parties punish male dictators with 
common names almost twice as much as their noble counterparts. We find no support for 
female discrimination. This result suggests that social status has important implications for 
men’s decisions to use economic punishment, and that this holds true in situations where 
reputation or strategic concerns have no importance. 
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1. Introduction 
In  all  societies,  normative  standards  of  behavior  are  enforced  by  formal  and  informal 
sanctions, and the importance of sanctioning possibilities for human economic interaction has 
been shown extensively (Ostrom, 2000, Fehr and Gächter, 2000, Carpenter and Matthews, 
2005). However, despite the  growing literature on sanctioning  behavior, most studies  are 
performed in anonymous settings without social context. We thus still know little about how 
punishment is affected by social cues.  
This study investigates how relative social status influences sanctioning behavior in a dictator 
game with third party punishment. The third party punishment game has been constructed and 
used to investigate norm enforcement (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). The status manipulation 
in this game pertains only to dictators. All participating third parties play against one of four 
confederates who participate as dictators in every session. The group of dictators consists of 
two men and two women. One of each gender has a noble name indicating high social status; 
the other has a common name indicating low status. We can then compare the level and 
frequency of punishment among third parties facing dictators of different social status. 
In society, sanctions are often imposed by third parties, and the important role of people’s 
actions as members of juries, committees and arbitrators has long been recognized. However, 
instead  of  sanctions  being  applied  impartially,  previous  research  finds  that  third  party 
punishment is likely to be shaped by social context such as parochialism or the punishers’ 
relation to the victim (Bernhard et al., 2006; Goette et al., 2006; Lieberman and Linke, 2007). 
With respect to the topic dealt with in this study, social status has been shown to affect the 
outcome of court proceedings in favour of higher status individuals (e.g. status of defendants 
see Sarnecki et al., 2006; Abrams et al., forthcoming, for status of the victim see Phillips 
2009).    3 
Status is often defined as the honor or prestige attached to one's position in society. General 
for many definitions of social status is that, apart from being a commonly recognized ranking 
of individuals in a given society, it also implies favourable treatment and increased access to 
resources when high (Weiss and Ferschtman, 1998; Ball et al., 2001, Fershtman and Gneezy, 
2001). In psychology and sociology, status hierarchies are analysed as a basis on which we 
construct  our  beliefs  and  behavior.
1  Social  asymmetries  thereby  define  perceptions  of 
deservingness, implicit performance expectations and shape appropriate behavior (Weber, 
1924; Cummins, 2000; Oxby, 2002). According to this literature, knowledge of relevant status 
relations is thus crucial to act successfully in social situations and relative status is likely to 
have a fundamental impact on human decision making.
2 
In this study we use noble names as  a  marker  of  high status; an indicator of possessing 
ascribed status through membership of the nobility. Using name as a status characteristic has 
many advantages. Most importantly, it is exogenous to the experimental setting  and can be 
introduced without drawing any attention to the status manipulation in itself. Participants thus 
remain ignorant about the true aim of the study. N obility  has  also  been shown to have 
behavioral implications in the Swedish marriage market.  Almenberg and Dreber (2009) find 
that noble individuals are more likely than commoners to find a partner from a higher wealth 
bracket than themselves. Further, possessing a noble name has no institutional meaning; the 
                                                 
1 For similar thoughts in economics see Akerlof and Kranton (2000) who discuss the impact of identity and 
social category on economic behavior. 
2 See for example the literature on Status Characteristics Theory, originally developed in Berger et al. (1966). It 
suggests that power and prestige rankings arise in interactional settings based on individual characteristics. 
Individuals possessing high status characteristics (such as being white, adult, male or tall) are judged as more 
able and better performing, as well as more deserving, independent of their actual performance (Hong and 
Bohnet, 2006). Status Characteristics Theory thus predicts subordination and superordination due to a voluntary 
and partly unconscious process (Webster and Driskell, 1978). Though SCT has also been criticized, a large 
literature of empirical studies confirm that status characteristics have powerful and predictable effects on how we 
judge other individuals, and what we expect from them (Kalkhoff and Barnum, 2000; Ridgeway et al, 1998; 
Hong and Bohnet, 2006; Simpson and Walker, 2002).   4 
Swedish nobility lost its last formal privileges in the 19
th century.  However, the surnames 
remain as explicit hereditary status markers.
3 
Previous literature in economics indicates that social status does affect economic behavior. In 
laboratory studies, high social status seems to imply larger economic gains.   Ball and Eckel 
(1996 and 1998) and Ball et al. (2001)  investigate the economic benefit of  experimentally 
manipulated status in an ultimatum game and  a double oral auction with multiple equilibria. 
Participants in the high status group receive better offers in both games, and this effect is 
persistent even in a treatment where allocation to the high status group is obviously random.
4 
In addition the authors test for the possibility of a status induced change in bidding behavior 
by rewarding status in private. In this treatment, where low status individuals are unaware of 
the status rewarded, the effect of status disappears. High social status thus appears to induce 
favourable treatment partly due to deference on behalf of lower status individuals. Preferential 
treatment of high status participants is also found by Glaeser et al., (2000) and Harbaugh et al. 
(2001) in the trust game. In both studies, participants with high status are found to elicit more 
trustworthy behavior on behalf of the trustees.
5 However, the studies by Ball and Eckel (1996, 
1998), Ball et al. (2001) and Glaeser et al. (2000) investigate the impact of social status in a 
non-anonymous setting, and hence cannot distinguish betwe en the effect of reputational or 
strategic concerns versus deference. 
This  study  extends  previous  research  in  a  number  of  ways.  First,  the  setting  is  semi -
anonymous. Semi-anonymity is achieved by revealing the names of the players participating 
                                                 
3 The last occasion a person was raised to the nobility in Sweden was in 1902, and the Swedish monarch has 
since then lost the right to ennoble. Surnames pertaining to a specific family benefit from stronger protection in 
the Swedish name law than more frequently occurring names. 
4. The experiment includes two treatments, and group allocation is random in both. However, whereas one of the 
allocation mechanisms is based on a public lottery, the other treatment divides subjects based on a trivia quiz. 
5 Glaeser et al., 2000 investigate behavior in a sample of Harvard undergraduates. The participants meet their 
counterpart before they are separated again and play the trust game. As status variables the authors consider for 
example hours worked for pay, hours spent volunteering, father’s education, number of close friends and proxies 
for popularity. Harbaugh et al., 2001 study the behavior of children aged 8, 11, 14 and 17. Age is here seen as a 
status marker.   5 
in the dictator game to the third party, but at the same time keeping the identity of the third 
party unknown to all other players. This allows us to examine whether social status influence 
punishment in a transparent way, absent effects of potential future interactions. Second, by 
using the third party punishment game (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004), we examine the effect 
of  status  through  the  sanction  choices  of  individuals  whose  payoff  is  independent  of  the 
decisions  previously  taken.  Third,  earlier  literature  within  economics  has  investigated 
preferential treatment in the reward domain. We here investigate whether social status also 
moderates sanctioning behavior.
6 The inclusion of one participant of each gender in each 
status category also allows us to investigate gender and status interactions. Gender  itself is 
highly connected to social status and previous research indicates that me n are more sensitive 
to social hierarchies (Campbell, 2002). For example, male groups develop steeper hierarchies 
and behave more competitively than female and mixed groups (Colarelli et al., 2006). In a 
laboratory experiment,  Huberman et al., 2004   find that  male participants sacrifice more 
resources to obtain social status than female. Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) also find an inter-
male discrimination only when they study discrimination in the trust game among Jews of 
different ethnicity. No discrimination is found on behalf of female participants. 
Our results indicate that low status men are punished to a greater extent than low status 
women, high status men, or high status women. Interestingly, discrimination occurs only in 
male to male interaction. For offers below half, or almost half of the allocated resource, male 
third parties punish male dictators with common names almost twice as much as their noble 
counterparts. We find no support for female discrimination. 
Differential treatment in the third party punishment game can arise due to different reasons. 
Therefore, having performed the third party punishment game, we  also ran a dictator game. 
                                                 
6 Ball and Eckel 1996 perform ultimatum games with status manipulations, but they report no results regarding 
the responder behavior.   6 
The confederates, who in the first game acted as dictators, are here featured as recipients. If 
punishment  evolved  as  a  norm  enforcing  mechanism  within  relatively  stable  groups  of 
individuals, altruistic behavior including altruistic punishment, should primarily pertain to in-
group members. If noble individuals are considered as out-group and commoners as in-group 
we  would  then  observe  higher  punishment  of  norm  violations  committed  by  low  status 
dictators in the third party punishment game and higher transfers to low status recipients in 
the dictator game. If discrimination arises due to liking of a particular status group, this group 
would experience lower punishment in the third party punishment game and receive higher 
giving in the dictator game to this group. 
The dictator game indicates no discrimination in transfers. We therefore find support neither 
for  an  in-group  bias  nor  a  difference  in  liking.  We  can  therefore  only  speculate  why 
discrimination arise in the punishment domain. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The subsequent section describes the experiment 
design of our study. In section three we present our results, before we conclude in section four 
where we discuss the possible explanations for our findings as well as future research. 
2. Experimental design 
The study consists of two separate economic games, a third party punishment game and a 
dictator game, each with the same status manipulation. Social status is differentiated via the 
participants’ surname, as explained below. All participants in the third party punishment game 
received a show up fee of 50 SEK
7. 
The third party punishment game ha s three participants, a dictator, a rec ipient and a third 
party. The implementation of the third party punishment game is similar to that of Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2004), where the dictator is endowed with twice the amount of the third party. In 
                                                 
7 At the time of the experiment 1 USD corresponded to about 6 SEK, i.e. 100 SEK was about 15 USD.   7 
our setting the dictator received 100 SEK and the third party 50 SEK. The recipient gets no 
money and has  no decision  to  make. The dictator can transfer money  to  the recipient  in 
multiples  of  10  SEK,  with  a  maximum  of  50  SEK.  Thereafter  the  third  party  decides, 
according to the strategy method, on potential punishment of the dictator’s payoff.
8 For each 
SEK that the third party chooses to punish the dictator’s payoff is reduced by three. The 
payoffs (Wi) of the third party punishment game are thus: 
Dictator: Wd(x,p)=100-x-3*p 
Third party: Wtp(p)=50-p 
Recipient: Wr(x)=x 
where x={10, 20, 30, 40, 50} is the sum the dictator transfers to the recipient and 
p={0,1,2,...,50} is the punishment imposed by the third party.  
Subjects were randomly allocated to the roles of recipients and third parties. For the position 
of dictator we recruited a group of four people; a woman and a man with the noble name von 
Essen, and a woman and a man with the common name Andersson.
9 This group participated 
as dictators in every session. Written instructions were distributed and read before making the 
decisions, and all third parties answered a set of control questions to ensure that they 
understood the consequences of their decisions. The recipients were asked to state their 
expectation concerning the third party punishment, also using the strategy method. 
                                                 
8 The strategy method is elicitation of contingent responses. The third party made a sanctioning decision 
contingent on each possible transfer level before being informed of the dictator’s decision. It is possible that this 
elicitation method induces different behaviors compared to a situation where the third party knows the dictators 
transfer decision (called the “specific response method”). Evidence from Cason and Mui (1998) and Brandts and 
Charness (2000) do not indicate that this is the case. 
9 These names are used as they are very strong indicators of nobility and vice versa. Von is a well known 
indicator of Swedish nobility and names ending with –sson are the most common names in Sweden. Andersson 
is the second most frequent surname. Swedish law awards intellectual property rights to surnames depending on 
how distinct they are. Names with the prefix von and other noble surnames are protected such that that a 
common person cannot add von to his or her surname (Statistics Sweden 
http://www.scb.se/Grupp/allmant/BE0801_2005K04_TI_10_A05ST0504.pdf, Access 090122). Andersson was 
chosen since we had easy access to people with that name who could participate in the study. The noble name of 
one of the authors was never revealed to the participants. Due to Swedish tax regulations we had to collect the 
name and address of all participants after they had completed the experiment. We were therefore able to control 
for whether the third parties where noble or not. In the sample of third parties there were none with a noble 
name.    8 
The status manipulation is apparent only to the third party, who sees the names of the two 
dictator  game  participants  on  top  of  the  decision  sheet.  The  experiment  is  thus  semi-
anonymous such that the third party knows the name of the dictator he or she punishes. In 
other aspects the game is anonymous and the third parties and recipients are aware of this. 
Apart from the names on the decision sheet, no reference was made to status or gender, and 
no subject indicated any interest in the names, nor in any aspect of status or gender. Each 
subject also answered a number of survey questions about age, gender, income, motives and 
beliefs  about  other  player’s  income  and  wealth.  This  gives  us  an  indication  about  the 
mechanisms behind the observed result. 
Based on the results from the third party punishment game only two of our confederates in the 
third party punishment game, the common and the noble man, were used as recipients in the 
dictator game. The dictator was endowed with 100 SEK and the recipient with was endowed 
with no money. Money could be transferred from the dictator to the recipient in multiples of 
10 SEK, with a maximum of 50 SEK. The recipient had no decision to make.  
The dictator game was run on a separate sample consisting only of male students. The status 
manipulation was semi-anonymous and implemented in the same way as in the third party 
punishment game. Each dictator saw the name of the recipient on top of his decision sheet. 
Apart from this, no reference was made to the other player or to status. In both games subjects 
were placed at separate locations and each session took approximately 20 minutes. 
3. Results: Does sanction behavior vary with social status? 
In  this  section,  we  start  by  presenting  the  general  results  regarding  third  party  behavior. 
Thereafter we address the effect of the dictator’s status category and gender on third parties 
decisions.  Throughout  the  analysis  we  explore  the  proportion  of  punishment,  i.e.  the 
percentage  of  those  who  punished,  as  well  as  the  level  of  punishment.  To  calculate  the   9 
proportion of punishment we define the binary variable punishment, defined as a positive 
payment on behalf of the third party at any transfer level. Punishment level is simply the 
average punishment across the third party sample at a specific  transfer level. We end by 
discussing  the  underlying  mechanisms  behind  the  results,  by  studying  the  behavior  in  a 
dictator  game  as  well  as  the  effect  of  third  party  beliefs  regarding  dictator  wealth  and 
income.
10 
3.1 General results 
In total, our sample consists of 132 observations of third party behavior, 63 male and 69 
female.
11 14 of these observations were removed from the sample. In a majority of the cases 
this was due to subjects indicating t hat they knew another participant, or incapacity to 
understand the experimental setup.
12 
We find that the majority of the third parties do punish, and the majority of the recipients also 
expect them to do so. Figure 1a shows the average proportions of actua l and expected 
punishment  for  each  transfer  level.   The  figure  indicates  that  recipients  expect  a  lower 
percentage of third parties to punish than who actually do so , apart from level 50 where 
spiteful behavior is expected to be more common than we observe . Similarly, the difference 
between expected and actual punishment level is only significant at the level of 50 ( see table 
                                                 
10 None of our variables were normally distributed according to a skewness and kurtosis test. For all relevant tests in 
the analysis, we have therefore performed a Mann-Whitney test as well as a two-sided t-test. Throughout the 
analysis we refer only to the p-value for the Mann-Whitney test unless there are differences in significance 
between the measures (at the 5 % level). When testing the equality between proportions we have performed a chi 
square test and a parametric test of proportions. If nothing else is stated the chi square test is presented. 
11 The participants came from three different Universities in Stockholm (Stockholm University, Stockholm 
School of Economics and Stockholm Royal School of Technology). We found no difference in punishment 
between the three schools. 
12 When running the experiment, we considered it important that participants understood the consequences of 
their actions. Further, we wanted to avoid participants with a previous personal relation that could influence their 
. 10 of the 14 observations dropped were removed due to incapacity to correctly fill in the control questions 
before the actual experiment started or due to subjects indicating that they knew another participant.  The 
remaining 4 third party observations were removed due to incomplete answers in the actual experiment. Of the 
14 dropped third party observations 8 were males and 6 females. We also had two participating noble subjects as 
recipients. In these cases we removed the von in the names, which resulted in non noble names existing in 
Sweden.    10 
1d in appendix). The effect however, is reversed.  The proportion of punishers and the level of 
punishment we observe in our sample are in accordance with earlier studies (see for example 
Fehr and Fishbacher, 2004; Leibrandt and Lopéz-Peréz, 2008).
13 
 
Figure 1a. Proportion of actual and expected punishment. 
 
For each 10 SEK reduction of transfer from the dictator, the third party imposes an average 
punishment  of  slightly  more  than  3  SEK,  or  a  deduction  of  about  10  SEK.  Thus,  in 
expectance, the dictator is left with 50 SEK no matter what he or she chooses to do. The 
average punishment for a dictator who keeps the whole endowment was 17 SEK, deducing 
the dictator’s income with 51 SEK.  
In  the  next  section  we  focus  on  the  distribution  of  punishment  based  on  two  dictator 
characteristics; gender and nobility. All our third parties have a non noble name, implying that 
we compare the punishment decision of a common third party facing either a noble or a 
common dictator.   
3.2 Punishment based on dictator nobility and gender 
                                                 
13 We find close to significant gender differences in proportion of punishment and punishment expectations. 
65% of the men and 79% of the women choose to punish (p=0,09). The corresponding numbers for expected 
punishment among male and female recipients is 60% and 76% (p=0.06). The level of punishment among third 
parties and the expected level of punishment among recipients do not vary by gender at any level of punishment.   11 
Variation in social status and gender entails four dictator categories in our experiment; noble 
women (NW), common women (CW), noble men (NM), and common men (CM). Among the 
common male dictators, 90% are punished at least at any level. The proportion of punishment 
in  the  other  three  categories  lies  between  60-70%.  Testing  for  equality  of  punishment 
proportions  between  common  men  and  the  other  groups  we  find  a  significant  difference 
compared to noble and common women, and a close to significant difference in relation to the 
group noble men (p-values 0.05, 0.01, and 0.09 respectively, see table 1c in appendix). This is 
an indication that both gender and social status play a role for sanctioning behavior.  
Figures 2a-e below illustrate the average level of punishment at each transfer level, separated 
by  the  two  dimensions;  gender  and  nobility.
14  Figure  2a  shows  the  average  level  of 
punishment of noble versus common dictators. The difference between the two categories is 
not significant, but the point estimate is higher for common dictators.  The following figure, 
2b, shows the average punishment at each transfer level   for female and male dictators 
separately. The total level of punishment and level of punishment at each transfer levels apart 
from 50 have p-values around 0.05, indicating that male dictators on average are punished 
harsher than female (see the corresponding p-values in table 2b in appendix). 
Figure 2a. Average level of punishment split by dictator nobility.  
                                                 
14 Subsequent Mann-Whitney p-values for test of equal averages in figures 2a-e are found in table 2 a-e in 
appendix. We report p-values for each transfer level, the total level and the total level excluding levels 40 and 50.    12 
Figure 2b. Average level of punishment split by dictator gender. 
Figure 2c. Average level of punishment split by dictator nobility and gender. 
 
Figure 2d. Average level of female punishment split by dictator category.  
 
Figure 2e. Average level of male punishment split by dictator category.  
Based on the results on punishment proportion we expect the group of common males to be 
punished the harshest. Figure 2c therefore shows a comparison of average punishment level of 
all four dictator categories, confirming that this is true. Table 2c below states the p-values for 
comparison of punishment levels between common men and all other categories. 
Table 2c. Punishment by dictator category. 
Transfer level  CM  NW  CW  NM  P-values  N 
0  21.3  14.2  15.9  16.7  0.03, 0.06, 0.20  29, 32, 28, 29 
10  17.8  11.3  11.5  12.0  0.01, 0.02, 0.03  29, 32, 28, 29 
20  12.9  8.8  8.6  9.3  0.03, 0.02, 0.10  29, 32, 28, 29   13 
30  8.4  6.0  5.6  5.4  0.07, 0.03, 0.08  29, 32, 28, 29 
40  4.0  3.5  2.6  2.6  0.10, 0.02, 0.13  29, 32, 28, 29 
50  0.7  1.3  1.1  0.6  0.39, 0.43, 0.74  29, 32, 28, 29 
Total  65.1  45.1  45.4  46.6  0.02, 0.02, 0.08  29, 32, 28, 29 
Total -50  64.5  43.8  44.3  46.0  0.05, 0.02, 0.07  29, 32, 28, 29 
Total -40  60.5  40.3  41.6  43.4  0.02, 0.02, 0.08  29, 32, 28, 29 
 
NW =Noble women, CW=common women, NM=noble men, and CM=common men. The variable “Total -
50“compounds punishment on all levels except level 50. The variable “Total -40“compounds punishment on all 
levels except level 50 and level 40. Sample size per group is reported in the order NW, CW, NM, CM.  
P-values indicate the probability of equal punishment between common men and the other categories 
respectively (noble women, common women and noble men). Using a two-sided ttest some of the differences in 
punishment between common men and noble and common women are insignificant, see appendix table 2c. 
 
Based on the differences in punishment level between male and female third parties figure 2d 
and 2e report the same numbers as in table 2c split by gender of the third party. Female 
punishment level, depicted in figure 2d and in table 2d in appendix, shows small, insignificant 
and inconsistent differences in punishment across dictator categories. This result stands in 
stark contrast to the punishment by men (figure 2e and table 2e). At transfer levels 0-30, 
where the dictator is most stingy, male third parties punish common male dictators almost 
twice as much as they punish noble ones. At each level between 10 and 30, as well as the total 
level, this difference in punishment is significant.
15 For the levels 0-20, the difference in 
punishment is 7 SEK or more, implying an additional reduction of 20 -30% of the common 
dictators’  initial  endowment.  Thus  our  results  indicate  that  sanctions  in  male  to  male 
interaction are influenced by relative status, as hypothesized in the introduction. High status 
males appear to be treated with leniency by other common male third parties. 
Table 2e. Male third party punishment by dictator category. 
Transfer level  CM  NW  CW  NM  P-values 
 
N 
0  24.3  12.7  14.1  15.8  0.04, 0.05, 0.13  14, 13, 12, 16 
10  19.4  9.2  10.5  10.3  0.02, 0.04, 0.02  14, 13, 12, 16 
20  14.4  7.8  7.5  7.5  0.04, 0.03, 0.04  14, 13, 12, 16 
30  9.9  5.6  4.5  4.2  0.06, 0.04, 0.04  14, 13, 12, 16 
40  4.2  4.9  1.4  2.4  0.21, 0.03, 0.21  14, 13, 12, 16 
50  0.6  3.0  0.0  0.4  0.42, 0.37, 0.88  14, 13, 12, 16 
                                                 
15 The 0 level is not significant in our study due to a few male subjects indicating double norms. These subjects 
motivated their punishment by either you give a lot or nothing.   14 
Total  72.9  43.2  37.9  40.6  0.04, 0.02, 0.05  14, 13, 12, 16 
Total -50  72.3  40.2  37.9  40.2  0.04, 0.02, 0.05  14, 13, 12, 16 
Total -40  68.1  35.4  36.5  37.8  0.03, 0.03, 0.04  14, 13, 12, 16 
NW =Noble women, CW=common women, NM=noble men, and CM=common men. The variable “Total -
50“compounds punishment on all levels except level 50. The variable “Total -40“compounds punishment on all 
levels except level 50 and level 40. Sample size per group is reported in the order NW, CW, NM, CM. P-values 
indicate the probability of equal punishment between common men and the other categories respectively (noble 
women, common women and noble men). Some p-values for the group of common men compared to noble 
women are insignificant when running a two-sided t-test, see appendix table 2e. 
 
 
In summary we find that the punishment decision of male third parties is affected by both the 
social  status  and  the  gender  of  the  perpetrator.  Female  punishment  decisions  exhibit  no 
consideration of social status.
16 
3.3 Giving in a dictator game 
The  discrimination  in  punishment  that  we  observe  can  be  due  to  at  least  two  types  of 
underlying  mechanisms.  First,  in-group  bias  among  common  men  would  cause  norm 
violations  by  in-group  members  to  warrant  harsher  punishment  than  violations  by  other 
individuals, in order to successfully enforce norms within the group
17.  Second, common men 
might simply like noble men more than common m en and therefore provide noble men with 
an economic premium. 
In order to separate these mechanisms we also ran a dictator game.  59 males participated in 
the game; we assigned 31 subjects to face a recipient with a common name and 28 subjects to 
face a recipient with a noble name.
18 Our results indicate that giving in the dictator game does 
not depend on the status of the recipient.  On average common men  receive 34.2 SEK and 
noble men 36.8 SEK, but this difference is far from significant (p-value of 0.2809)
19. In the 
                                                 
16  The analysis indicates that third party punishment behavior is dependent on the third party’s relation to 
dictator characteristics. We therefore also studied whether third party discrimination was affected by gender 
composition of the dictator game participants. For example, we tested whether a male third party facing a male 
dictator punished differently depending on the gender of the recipient. We found no indication that this relation 
mattered. The sample sizes in each group are very small therefore this should be seen as mere indications.  
17 However previous empirical literature indicates that out-group members are punished harder when the victim 
is an in-group member (Bernhard et al., 2006; Lieberman and Linke, 2007). 
18 All participants were students at Stockholm University or Stockholm Royal School of Technology. 
19 A sample size analysis assuming an alpha of 0.05 and a power of 80% indicate that we would need a sample   15 
study by Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) a difference is found in trust behavior depending on 
social category. However, in line with our results, no differentiation based on social category 
is found in a dictator game. Our results do thus neither support the explanation of in-group 
bias nor that of liking. They point out that discrimination depending on status pertains only to 
the punishment domain, and not to giving.  
3.4 Further analysis 
The discrimination based on social category that we observe might also be due not to social 
status per se but to variables correlated, or perceived to be correlated, with nobility. Nobility 
may for example influence beliefs about dictator wealth, income or education. We identify 
two potential sources of bias. First, if variables believed to be correlated with nobility have 
status implications in their own right, this leads us to overestimate the effect of nobility. 
Second, beliefs of high wealth or income may also reinforce mechanisms not directly linked 
to status such as inequality aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; 
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). If participants believe that nobility is positively correlated with 
wealth,  inequality  aversion  would  cause  us  to  underestimate  the  effect  of  social  status 
(nobility). As shown in Almenberg and Dreber, 2009 the Swedish nobility has a higher wealth 
than the common population. The fact that women are found to be more inequality averse 
than men could be a contributing factor to the gender differences in discrimination we find 
(Andreoni  and  Vesterlund  2001,  Dickinson  and  Tiefenthaler  2002,  Selten  and  Ockenfels 
1998). 
All third parties in the third party punishment game were asked to state their beliefs regarding 
dictator wealth and income in relation to the average student and all dictators in the dictator 
game were asked to do the same with respect to the recipient. The number of third parties who 
                                                                                                                                                         
size of 2096 subjects in order to get significant results. Se appendix table 3a for descriptive statistics.   16 
indicated that they believed the dictator to have a higher wealth and income than the average 
student are roughly equal irrespective of whether they faced a noble or a non-noble dictator.
20  
Further, what subject’s rate as being fair is not influenced by the status of the recipient in any 
of the two games. Further, 82 percent of participants consider an equal split as fair behavior. 
This corroborates the findings of Lieberman and Linke (2004), who find that even though 
third  party  punishment  varies  with  social  category,  the  third  parties’  moral  judgement 
pertaining to the norm violation does not. It thus appears as if it is the scale of punishment that 
differs across status categories, not the judgement of the norm in itself. These results indicate 
that social status, also when controlling for beliefs of relative income and wealth, has an 
impact on costly punishment behavior in male to male interactions when distribution norms 
are  violated.  We  also  performed  regression  analysis  which  confirm  our  main  results  and 
indicate that third party beliefs concerning the wealth and income of the dictator as well as 
fairness have no significant effect on punishment.
21 
4. Discussion 
Previous  research  in  economics  indicates  that  high  social  status  conveys  an  economic 
premium (Ball and Eckel, 1996, 1998; Ball et al., 2001; Glaeser et al., 2000; Almenberg and 
Dreber, 2009). Our results illustrate that high social status induces lower punishment in a third 
                                                 
20 Of those third parties facing a noble dictator, 17 (12) subjects thought their counterpart to had a higher wealth 
(income) than the average student. Among those facing a non-noble dictator, the corresponding number was 16 
(14). These numbers are evenly distributed among men and women. Male noble dictators playing a third party 
who assumed him to have a wealth above average, are punished the least of all groups. Non-noble dictators, 
whose third party assumed him to have a high wealth are punished the harshest. In the male-to-male punishment 
of commoners the effect of wealth beliefs goes in the opposite direction. However, the sample sizes are too small 
for a relevant analysis. 
21 The OLS regression analysis is based on parametric assumptions that may not be fulfilled. The same set of 
control variables was included in the regression for each punishment level; beliefs about income, wealth and 
fairness, gender of all players, university and age of third party. The variables for beliefs regarding wealth and 
income were coded as 1, if third parties who believed the dictator to have a wealth (income) above the average 
student and 0 otherwise. The variable for fairness was coded to take the value 1 if subjects indicated an equal 
split of the initial dictator endowment as fair and 0 otherwise. We also pooled the data over all six decisions 
elicited by the strategy method for each third party, clustering on individual third parties. In all regressions male 
to male discrimination is significant (p-value 0.033), and beliefs of wealth and income remain insignificant. The 
results from the regression analysis are available upon request.    17 
party punishment game, though only in male to male interactions. Male third parties punish 
common male dictators almost twice as much as their noble counterparts, but no effect is 
found in female to female or mixed interactions. We do not find a discriminatory effect of 
social status on altruistic behavior in a dictator game; male participants are not more generous 
to high status individuals. 
For  several  reasons,  the  effect  of  social  status  in  the  third  party  punishment  game  is 
surprisingly large. The Swedish nobility lost all its formal economic and political privileges in 
the 19
th century. The status variable thus has no relation to the experimental context or to 
merit, and no references were made to name, nobility or social status during the experiment. 
The semi-anonymous design also diminishes reputation and strategic concerns. Despite this, 
the average punishment is  significantly different  between  male  status  categories, and this 
difference represents 20-30 percent of the dictators’ initial endowments. The effect remains 
stable  when  controlling  for  beliefs  of  wealth  and  income,  and  does  not  rely  on  fairness 
considerations being status dependent. 
Our results corroborate previous research implying that men are more sensitive to social status 
in economic decision making tasks (Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Huberman et al, 2004). 
Many hierarchies in western society have throughout history been exclusive for men or male 
dominated.  Nobility  in  Sweden,  for  example,  is  only  hereditary  on  the  male  side;  thus 
historically implying a larger value for men. If men were and are more likely to benefit from 
status, such as nobility, this explains the higher level of investment in status observed by men 
in comparison to women (Campbell, 2002; Huberman et al., 2004; Pawlowski et al., 2000). 
Men are also often found to be more competitive compared to women (see review by Croson 
and Gneezy, 2009). Since noble names are impossible to acquire, competition for status in the 
context  of  the  present  study  is  relevant  only  within  the  group  of  non  noble  names.  An 
additional reason for the discrepancy in male and female behavior could be gender differences   18 
in inequality aversion.  Previous literature has found women to be more inequality averse 
compared to men (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Dickinson and Teifenhaler, 2002; Selten 
and Ockenfels, 1998). If high social status is associated with other benefits, females should 
punish high status individuals more. 
A few studies have explored in-group bias settings with third party punishment (Bernhard et 
al. 2008 and Götte et al. 2006). Contrary to what is found in this study, Bernhard et al. (2006) 
find that dictators from another group than the third party are punished harsher when facing a 
recipient from the same group as the third party. Lieberman and Linke (2004) found similar 
results in a hypothetical setting. This is the opposite of what in-group bias in a third party 
punishment game would predict if punishment serves as a norm enforcing device. All our 
third parties and recipients are from the same status group, individuals with non noble names. 
The divergence of our results in relation to the other studies may partly be explained by the 
fact that individuals with a common name can be considered a large and not well defined 
social group, or that status considerations override group belonging. Our results also differ 
from what Fehr et al. (2008) find in a trust game with third party punishment in India. They 
find that low caste participants punish less than high caste participants, but punishment in 
both groups is independent of the caste belonging of the norm violator. Several potential 
mechanisms might explain this variation in results. Norm enforcement could, for example, 
differ between cooperative and distribution norms.  Fehr et al. (2010) propose that historically 
repressed groups have a lesser willingness to punish violators in general. Culture might create 
differences  between  the  studies;  India’s  cast  system  induces  a  more  pronounced  status 
hierarchy and may therefore repress the decision to punish by low status individuals more 
than the historical division between nobility and commoners in Sweden. Even though the 
Swedish  nobility  lost  its  privileges  more  than  a  decade  ago  one  could  speculate  that  the 
punishment  specific  discrimination  is  due  to  historic  power  inequalities.  The  decision  to   19 
punish an individual of higher status may entail a larger risk of retaliation than the decision 
not  to  give.  Speculating  further,  this  fear  of  retaliation  may  have  been  internalized  as 
differences in the penalty scale for a specific norm violation depending on social status. The 
result in Lieberman and Linke (2004) as well as the fairness judgements in our study supports 
the  suggestion  that  the  moral  judgment  of  a  norm  transgression  is  stable  across  social 
categories. Further Fehr et al. (2010) do not differentiate between men and women, which 
diminishes the comparability between the two studies. 
Our  study  shows  a  surprisingly  large  effect  of  social  status  on  punishment  behavior, 
underlining the importance of social status as a modulator of behavior in male interactions. By 
guiding  appropriate  behavior,  knowledge  of  status  relations  is  an  important  key  to 
successfully navigate in human societies. Future research is needed concerning various types 
of social status and its implications for economic decision making in different situations.    20 
Experiment instructions 
Instructions for participant A. 
Welcome to this study in economics! 
Please read the following instructions carefully. Depending on how you and your counterparts 
decide, you can earn money in addition to the 50 SEK you earn by participating. Therefore, it 
is important that you read and follow the instructions.   
Please do not talk during the study. If you have any questions, raise your hand and we will 
come to answer your question.  
Throughout this study you will use Swedish crowns. The study comprises three types of 
participants: Participants A, participants B and participants C. You are a participant A. 
During the study, you will interact with one randomly assigned participant B and one 
randomly assigned participant C.  
Specific Instructions for the Experiment Procedure 
Stage one 
In the first stage, participants A are the sole decision-makers. As a participant A you have got 
an endowment of 100 SEK. Participant C gets 50 SEK, and participant B gets no endowment. 
We ask you to decide how many of the 100 SEK that you wish to assign to participant B. You 
can give participant B a number of SEK between 0 and 50 in a multiple of tens, i.e. 0, 10, 20, 
30, 40, or 50 SEK. If, for example, you grant participant B 40 SEK, your income at the end of 
stage one will amount to 60 SEK, and participant B’s income will amount to 40 SEK. If you 
accord her/him 10 SEK, your income will be 90 SEK, and the income of participant B will be 
10 SEK at the end of stage one. If you grant B 0 SEK, your income at the end of stage one 
will amount to 100 SEK while participant B’s equals 0 SEK. 
Stage two 
In stage two, only participants C have a decision to make. Participant C can pay to deduct 
money from your payoff. Each SEK charged to you as participant A diminishes your income 
by 3 SEK, and participant C’s income is reduced by 1 SEK. Participant C can deduct a 
number of SEK between 0 and 50. Suppose participant C deducts 2 SEK: your income will 
then be reduced by 6 SEK while participant C’s income will be reduced by 2 SEK. If 
participant C deducts 19 SEK to you, your income diminishes by 57 SEK and participant C’s 
income is reduced by 19 SEK. Participant C takes her or his decision before knowing your 
decision, and hence answers how they would like to allocate their money for every possible 
decision you can make.    21 
This is how we calculate participants A’s, B’s, and C’s respective incomes: 
Participant A’s income amounts to 
+ 100 SEK (participant A’s endowment) 
- number of SEK assigned to participant  B by participant A 
- 3 times the number of deduction SEK transferred to participant A by participant C 
Participant B’s income amounts to 
+ number of SEK assigned to participant  B by participant A 
Participant C’s income amounts to 
+ 50 (participant C’s endowment) 
- number of deduction SEK charged participant A by participant C 
Please note that your earnings may be negative, in which case the SEK will be deducted 
from your participation payment.   22 
Control Questions 
It is important that all participants have understood the rules of the game. Therefore we ask 
you to answer the following control questions. When you have finished, signal to us by 
raising your hand.  
A. Participant A assigns 0 SEK to participant B. 
a) Participant C charges participant with 0 SEK deduction. 
What is participant A’s income? ______________ 
What is participant B’s income? ______________ 
What is participant C’s income? ______________ 
 
b) Participant C charges participant A with 30 SEK deduction. 
What is participant A’s income? ______________ 
What is participant B’s income? ______________ 
What is participant C’s income? ______________ 
 
2. Participant A assigns 40 SEK to participant B. 
a) Participant C charges participant A with 0 SEK deduction. 
What is participant A’s income? ______________ 
What is participant B’s income? ______________ 
What is participant C’s income? ______________ 
 
b) Participant C charges participant A with15 SEK deduction. 
What is participant A’s income? ______________ 
What is participant B’s income? ______________ 
What is participant C’s income? ______________   23 
Decision sheet participant A. 
Below we ask you to decide how much you want to transfer to participant B. We also ask you 
to give us your best estimation of C’s decision. This estimate is to be made for every possible 
decision you can make. Enter your estimates below on this sheet. In the box to the right of the 
number 0, you enter the number of SEK you believe participant C transfers to you in the event 
that you grant participant B 0 SEK. In the box beside the number 10 you enter the number of 
SEK you believe participant C transfers to you if you choose to grant B 10 SEK, and so on.  
 
Your decision 
You may transfer 0, 0, 20, 30, 40, or 50 SEK to participant B 
How many SEK do you want to transfer? _______________. 
 
How do you believe is participant C going to decide? 
Number of SEK 
you grant B 
 
Number of SEK 
participant C 
transfers to you 
 
0   
10   
20   
30   
 
40   
50   
 
 
When you have taken your decisions, please turn the page and answer a few survey questions.   24 
Survey questions for participant A 
 
1. What are you studying? _______________________________ 
2. I am a   woman   ⁫   man  ⁫  
3. I am _________ years old. 
4. What do you think is a fair allocation of the 100 SEK?  
5. What is the reason behind the decision you made?   25 
Instructions for participant B. 
Welcome to this study in economics! 
Please read the following instructions carefully. Depending on how you and your counterparts 
decide, you can earn money in addition to the 50 SEK you earn by participating. Therefore, it 
is important that you read and follow the instructions.   
Please do not talk during the study. If you have any questions, raise your hand and we will 
come to answer your question.  
Throughout this study you will use Swedish crowns. The study comprises three types of 
participants: Participants A, participants B and participants C. You are a participant B. 
During the study, you will interact with one randomly assigned participant A and one 
randomly assigned participant C.  
Description of the two parts of the study 
Stage one 
In the first stage, participants A are the sole decision-makers. At the beginning of stage one, 
participants A get an endowment of 100 SEK. Participants C get an endowment of 50 SEK, 
whereas you as a participant B get no endowment. Participant A must decide how many of 
her/his 100 SEK s/he wishes to assign to you. S/he can transfer to you a number of SEK 
between 0 and 50 in a multiple of tens, i.e. 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, or 50 SEK. If, for example, 
participant A grants you 40 SEK, her/his income at the end of stage one will amount to 60 
SEK, and your income will amount to 40 SEK. If s/he accords you 10 SEK, her/his income 
will be 90 SEK, and your own income will be 10 SEK. If s/he grants you 0 SEK, her/his 
income, at the end of stage one will result in 100 SEK, and your own income will result in 0 
SEK. 
Stage two 
In stage two, only the participants C have a decision to make. Participant C can pay to deduct 
money from A. Each SEK charged to participant A diminishes A’s income by 3 SEK, and 
participant C’s income is reduced by 1 SEK. Participant C can deduct a number of SEK 
between 0 and 50. Suppose participant C charges 2 SEK: A’s income will then be reduced by 
6 SEK while participant C’s income will be reduced by 2 SEK. If participant C deducts 19 
SEK to A, A’s income diminishes by 57 SEK and participant C’s income is reduced by 19 
SEK. Participant C takes her or his decision before knowing A’s decision, and hence answers 
how they would like to allocate their money for every possible decision A can make.    26 
This is how we calculate participants A’s, B’s, and C’s respective incomes: 
Participant A’s income amounts to 
+ 100 SEK (participant A’s endowment) 
- number of SEK assigned to participant  B by participant A 
- 3 times the number of deduction SEK transferred to participant A by participant C 
 
Participant B’s income amounts to 
+ number of SEK assigned to participant  B by participant A 
 
Participant C’s income amounts to 
+ 50 (participant C’s endowment) 
- number of deduction SEK charged participant A by participant C 
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Control Questions 
It is important that all participants have understood the rules of the game. Therefore we ask 
you to answer the following control questions. When you have finished, signal to us by 
raising your hand.  
A. Participant A assigns 0 SEK to participant B. 
a) Participant C charges participant with 0 SEK deduction. 
What is participant A’s income? ______________ 
What is participant B’s income? ______________ 
What is participant C’s income? ______________ 
 
b) Participant C charges participant A with 30 SEK deduction. 
What is participant A’s income? ______________ 
What is participant B’s income? ______________ 
What is participant C’s income? ______________ 
 
2. Participant A assigns 40 SEK to participant B. 
a) Participant C charges participant A with 0 SEK deduction. 
What is participant A’s income? ______________ 
What is participant B’s income? ______________ 
What is participant C’s income? ______________ 
 
b) Participant C charges participant A with 15 SEK deduction. 
What is participant A’s income? ______________ 
What is participant B’s income? ______________ 
What is participant C’s income? ______________   28 
Decision sheet participant B. 
Below we ask you to estimate the other participants’ decisions. This estimate is to be made for 
every possible decision A and C can make. Enter your estimates below on this sheet. In the 
box to the right of the number 0, you enter the number of SEK you believe participant C 
transfers to A in the event that A grants participant you 0 SEK. In the box beside the number 
10 you enter the number of SEK you believe participant C transfers to A if A chooses to grant 
you 10 SEK, and so on.  
 
Your estimation 
A may transfer 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, or 50 SEK to you 
How many SEK do you think A transfers? _______________.. 
 
How do you believe is participant C going to decide? 




Number of SEK 
deducted by 
participant C  
 
0   
10   
20   
30   
 
40   
50   
 
 
When you have estimated the other participants’ behavior, please turn the page and respond to 
a few survey questions.   29 
Survey questions  
1. What are you studying? _______________________________ 
2. I am a   woman   ⁫   man  ⁫  
3. I am _________ years old. 
4. How do you think that your average monthly income relates to the average student? 
_ Below the average     _ Close to average     _ Above the average      _ Don’t know 
4. How do you think that your wealth relates to the average student? 
_ Below the average     _ Close to average     _ Above the average      _ Don’t know 
5. What do you think is a fair allocation of the 100 SEK?    30 
Instructions for Participants C 
Welcome to this study in economics! 
Please read the following instructions carefully. Depending on how you and your counterparts 
decide, you can earn money in addition to the 50 SEK you earn by participating. Therefore, it 
is important that you read and follow the instructions.   
Please do not talk during the study. If you have any questions, raise your hand and we will 
come to answer your question.  
Throughout this study you will use Swedish crowns. The study comprises three types of 
participants: Participants A, participants B and participants C. You are a participant C. 
During the study, you will interact with one randomly assigned participant B and one 
randomly assigned participant C.  
Description of the two parts of the study 
Stage one 
In the first stage, participants A are the sole decision-makers. At the beginning of the stage, 
participant A gets an endowment of 100 SEK. You as a participant C get an endowment of 50 
SEK. Participant B gets no endowment. Participant A must decide  how many of her/his 100 
SEK s/he wishes to assign to participant B. S/he can transfer to participant B a number of 
SEK between 0 and 50 in a multiple of tens, i.e. 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, or 50 SEK. If, for example, 
participant A grants participant B 40 SEK, her/his income at the end of stage one will amount 
to 60 SEK, and participant B's income will amount to 40 SEK. If s/he grants participant B 10 
SEK, her/his income will be 90 SEK, and participant B’s income will be 10 SEK at the end of 
stage one. If s/he grants participant B 0 SEK, her/his income, at the end of stage one, will 
result in 100 SEK, and participant B’s own income will result in 0 SEK. 
Stage two 
In stage two, you, as participant C, are the only one to make a decision. You can pay to deduct 
SEK from participant A. Each SEK you deduct from participant A diminishes your income by 
1 SEK and participant A’s income by 3 SEK. You can assign any number of SEK between 0 
and 50. Suppose you deduct 2 SEK to participant A, your income will be reduced by 2 SEK, 
and participant A’s income will be reduced by 6 SEK. If you assign 19 SEK to participant A, 
your income is diminished by 19 SEK and participant A’s income is reduced by 57 SEK.   31 
This is how we calculate participants A’s, B’s, and C’s respective incomes: 
Participant A’s income amounts to 
+ 100 SEK (participant A’s endowment) 
- number of SEK assigned to participant  B by participant A 
- 3 times the number of deduction SEK transferred to participant A by participant C 
 
Participant B’s income amounts to 
+ number of SEK assigned to participant  B by participant A 
 
Participant C’s income amounts to 
+ 50 (participant C’s endowment) 
- number of deduction SEK charged participant A by participant C 
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Control Questions 
It is important that all participants have understood the rules of the game. Therefore we ask 
you to answer the following control questions. When you have finished, signal to us by 
raising your hand.  
A. Participant A assigns 0 SEK to participant B. 
a) Participant C charges participant with 0 SEK deduction. 
What is participant A’s income? ______________ 
What is participant B’s income? ______________ 
What is participant C’s income? ______________ 
 
b) Participant C charges participant A with 30 SEK deduction. 
What is participant A’s income? ______________ 
What is participant B’s income? ______________ 
What is participant C’s income? ______________ 
 
2. Participant A assigns 40 SEK to participant B. 
a) Participant C charges participant A with 0 SEK deduction. 
What is participant A’s income? ______________ 
What is participant B’s income? ______________ 
What is participant C’s income? ______________ 
 
b) Participant C charges participant A with15 SEK deduction. 
What is participant A’s income? ______________ 
What is participant B’s income? ______________ 








Decision sheet participant C. 
 
In the first part participant A decides how many SEK to give to B. In the second part you 
decide how many SEK to deduct. We ask you to state your decision for every possible 
decision that A may make. In the box to the right of the number 0, you enter the number of 
SEK you want to transfer to participant A in the event that A grant participant B 0 SEK. In the 
box beside the number 10 you enter the number of SEK you want to transfer to Participant A 
in case s/he chooses to transfer 10 SEK to B, and so on.   
 
Please determine the number of SEK to deduce, if any, you transfer to participant A. 
 





Number of SEK 
you transfer to 
participant A 
 
0   
10   
20   
30   
 
40   







When you have taken your decision, please turn the page and respond to a few survey 
questions. 
   34 
Survey questions 
1. What are you studying? _______________________________ 
2. I am a   woman   ⁫   man  ⁫  
3. I am _________ years old. 
4. How do you think that participant A’s income relates to the average student? 
_ Below the average     _ Close to average     _ Above the average      _ Don’t know 
5. How do you think that participant A’s wealth relates to the average student? 
_ Below the average     _ Close to average     _ Above the average      _ Don’t know 
6. How do you think that your average monthly income relates to the average student? 
_ Below the average     _ Close to average     _ Above the average      _ Don’t know 
7. How do you think that your wealth relates to the average student? 
_ Below the average     _ Close to average     _ Above the average      _ Don’t know 
8. What do you think is a fair allocation of the 100 SEK?  
9. What is the reason behind the decision you made?   35 
Appendix 
Descriptive statistics  
 
Table 1a. Descriptive statistics. 
Variable  n  Mean  p50  Sd  Min  Max 
Female TP  118  0.53  1  0.50  0  1 
Female R  118  0.56  1  0.50  0  1 
Female D  118  0.51  1  0.50  0  1 
Nobel women  118  0.27  0  0.45  0  1 
Nobel men  118  0.25  0  0.43  0  1 
Common women  118  0.24  0  0.43  0  1 
Common men  118  0.25  0  0.43  0  1 
Level 0  118  16.94  16.5  14.29  0  50 
Level 10  118  13.11  13  11.55  0  40 
Level 20  118  9.88  10  9.19  0  40 
Level 30  118  6.38  5  7.38  0  40 
Level 40  118  3.22  0  5.08  0  30 
Level 50  118  0.93  0  4.06  0  30 
Punishment  118  0.73  1  0.45  0  1 
Fairness  109  0.82  1  0.39  0  1 
Age  118  25.88  24  8.33  17  71 
Descriptive statistics of all variables included in our analysis. Level 0-50 indicates the actual level of punishment 
at each transfer level. Punishment and Justice are dummy variables; Punishment takes the value 1 when 
punishment was exerted at any level and 0 otherwise, and Justice takes the value 1 if a 50/50 split of the initial 
money was indicated as the fair division and 0 otherwise.  
 
 
Table 1b. Sample size and attrition. 
Sample  TP  R 
Full sample  132  132 
Males  59  52 
Females  73  73 
Attrition  14  11 
Males  7  5 
Females  7  6 
Total  118  121 
Recipient attrition refers to the case of recipients who were not able to answer either the control questions 
correctly, or who did not state beliefs for all alternatives elicited through the strategy method. In these cases we 
used their names on the third parties decision sheets, but dropped them when estimating expected proportion and 
level of punishment.   36 
 Proportion of punishment  
 
Table 1c. Proportion of punishment. 
Punishment 
proportions 
All  Men  Women 
Nw  0.69  0.57  0.78 
Cw  0.61  0.54  0.67 
Nm  0.72  0.58  0.82 










Cm vs Nw  0.05  0.05   
Cm vs Cw  0.01  0.01   
Cm vs Nm  0.09  0.09   
Proportion of actual punishment by dictator characteristics and third party gender. NW=noble female dictators, 
CW=common male dictators, NM=noble male dictators and CM=common male dictators. 
 
 
Table 1d. Expected vs. actual punishment (proportion and level) 
Punishment  
proportions 






0  0.61  0.72  0.10  0.07 
10  0.68  0.71  0.58  0.57 
20  0.67  0.71  0.49  0.48 
30  0.63  0.63  1.00  0.99 
40  0.50  0.49  1.00  0.95 
50  0.28  0.11  <0.01  <0.01 
Punishment  
Level 






0  14.8  16.9  0.19  0.27 
10  13.3  13.1  0.93  0.89 
20  11.2  9.9  0.70  0.32 
30  9.3  6.4  0.13  0.02 
40  6.9  3.2  0.94  <0.01 
50  5.2  0.9  <0.01  <0.01 
 
 
Table 2a. Punishment level of noble and common dictators. 
Transfer 
level 







0  15.4  18.6  3.3  0.23  0.22  61, 57 
10  11.6  14.7  3.1  0.15  0.14  61, 57 
20  9.0  10.8  1.8  0.26  0.29  61, 57 
30  5.8  7.0  1.3  0.36  0.35  61, 57 
40  3.1  3.4  0.3  0.65  0.76  61, 57 
50  1.0  0.9  -0.1  0.85  0.89  61, 57 
Total  45.8  55.4  9.6  0.24  0.26  61, 57 
Total -50  44.8  54.5  9.7  0.24  0.24  61, 57 
total -40  41.8  51.2  9.4  0.22  0.21  61, 57   37 
 
 
Table 2b. Punishment level of female and male dictators. 
Transfer 
level 







0  15.0  19.0  4.0  0.04  0.13  60,58 
10  11.4  14.9  3.5  0.03  0.10  60,58 
20  8.7  11.1  2.4  0.03  0.15  60,58 
30  5.8  6.9  1.1  0.05  0.41  60,58 
40  3.1  3.3  0.2  0.04  0.85  60,58 
50  1.2  0.6  -0.6  0.15  0.44  60,58 
Total  45.2  55.9  10.7  0.03  0.21  60,58 
Total -50  44.0  55.2  11.2  0.03  0.17  60,58 
Total -40  40.9  51.9  11.1  0.03  0.14  60,58 
 
 
Table 2c. Punishment by dictator category. 
Transfer 
level 







0  21.3  14.2  15.9  16.7  0.03, 0.06, 0.20  0.05, 0.16, 0.18  29, 32, 28, 29 
10  17.8  11.3  11.5  12.0  0.01, 0.02, 0.03  0.03, 0.04, 0.03  29, 32, 28, 29 
20  12.9  8.8  8.6  9.3  0.03, 0.02, 0.10  0.08, 0.08, 0.09  29, 32, 28, 29 
30  8.4  6.0  5.6  5.4  0.07, 0.03, 0.08  0.22, 0.17, 0.06  29, 32, 28, 29 
40  4.0  3.5  2.6  2.6  0.10, 0.02, 0.13  0.71, 0.32, 0.12  29, 32, 28, 29 
50  0.7  1.3  1.1  0.6  0.39, 0.43, 0.74  0.53, 0.69, 0.94  29, 32, 28, 29 
Total  65.1  45.1  45.4  46.6  0.02, 0.02, 0.08  0.02, 0.12, 0.07  29, 32, 28, 29 
Total -50  64.5  43.8  44.3  46.0  0.05, 0.02, 0.07  0.02, 0.10, 0.07  29, 32, 28, 29 
Total -40  60.5  40.3  41.6  43.4  0.02, 0.02, 0.08  0.02, 0.09, 0.07  29, 32, 28, 29 
 
NW =Noble women, CW=common women, NM=noble men, and CM=common men. The variable “Total -
50“compounds punishment on all levels except level 50. The variable “Total -40“compounds punishment on all 
levels except level 50 and level 40. Sample size per group is reported in the order NW, CW, NM, CM.  
P-values indicate the probability of equal punishment between common men and the other categories 
respectively (noble women, common women and noble men). 
 
 
Table 2d. Female third party punishment by dictator category. 
Transfer 
level 







0  17.5  15.3  17.5  17.3  all >0.2  all >0.2  18, 15, 17, 13 
10  15.8  12.9  12.3  13.2  all >0.2  all >0.2  18, 15, 17, 13 
20  11.2  9.5  9.6  10.6  all >0.2  all >0.2  18, 15, 17, 13 
30  6.6  6.4  6.5  6.4  all >0.2  all >0.2  18, 15, 17, 13 
40  3.8  2.5  3.8  2.7  all >0.2  all >0.2  18, 15, 17, 13 
50  0.7  0  2.1  0.8  all >0.2*  all >0.2*  18, 15, 17, 13 
Total  55.6  46.6  51.8  50.9  all >0.2  all >0.2  18, 15, 17, 13 
Total -50  54.9  46.6  49.7  50.1  all >0.2  all >0.2  18, 15, 17, 13 
Total -40  51.1  44.1  45.9  47.4  all >0.2  all >0.2  18, 15, 17, 13   38 
*The difference between the punishment of common men and noble women is significant at the level of 50 
(MW: p=0.04, ttest: p=0.07). However, given the number of tests ran, we would expect some false positives to 
occur. NW=noble female dictators, CW=common male dictators, NM=noble male dictators and CM=common 
male dictators. Sample size per group is reported in the order NW, CW, NM, CM. P-values indicate the 
probability of equal punishment between common men and the other categories respectively (noble women, 
common women and noble men). 
 
 
Table 2e. Male third party punishment by dictator category. 
Transfer 
level 







0  24.3  12.7  14.1  15.8  0.04, 0.05, 0.13  0.02, 0.06, 0.10  14, 13, 12, 16 
10  19.4  9.2  10.5  10.3  0.02, 0.04, 0.02  0.02, 0.05, 0.03  14, 13, 12, 16 
20  14.4  7.8  7.5  7.5  0.04, 0.03, 0.04  0.06, 0.04, 0.03  14, 13, 12, 16 
30  9.9  5.6  4.5  4.2  0.06, 0.04, 0.04  0.19, 0.04, 0.02  14, 13, 12, 16 
40  4.2  4.9  1.4  2.4  0.21, 0.03, 0.21  0.79, 0.04, 0.19  14, 13, 12, 16 
50  0.6  3.0  0.0  0.4  0.42, 0.37, 0.88  0.26, 0.38, 0.80  14, 13, 12, 16 
Total  72.9  43.2  37.9  40.6  0.04, 0.02, 0.05  0.11, 0.04, 0.04  14, 13, 12, 16 
Total -50  72.3  40.2  37.9  40.2  0.04, 0.02, 0.05  0.06, 0.04, 0.03  14, 13, 12, 16 
Total -40  68.1  35.4  36.5  37.8  0.03, 0.03, 0.04  0.03, 0.04, 0.03  14, 13, 12, 16 
NW =Noble women, CW=common women, NM=noble men, and CM=common men. The variable “Total -
50“compounds punishment on all levels except level 50. The variable “Total -40“compounds punishment on all 
levels except level 50 and level 40. Sample size per group is reported in the order NW, CW, NM, CM. P-values 
indicate the probability of equal punishment between common men and the other categories respectively (noble 
women, common women and noble men). 
 
 
Dictator game - descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3a. Descriptive statistics dictator game. 
Variable  N  Mean  Median  Sd  Min  Max 
Common name  31  65.8  50  20.6  50  100 
Noble name  28  63.2  50  21.6  50  100 
Total  59  64.6  50  21.0  50  100 
 
 
Table 3b. Giving by recipient category. 







Level of giving  63.2  65.8  0.28  0.64  28,31 
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